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The Changing Role of the United
Nations: Halting Nuclear Proliferation In
Iraq
I. Introduction
The war of the future would be one in which man could extin-
guish millions of lives with one blow, demolish the great cities of
the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past and
destroy the very structure of civilization that has slowly and
painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war
is not a possible policy for rational men.'
The bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki created a nuclear
cloud that has hovered over the citizens of all nations since World
War II. The threat of a nuclear holocaust peaked in October 1967
during the Cuban Missile Crisis when a nuclear war between the
United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union (hereinafter the
Commonwealth of Independent States) seemed imminent. However,
a combination of strategic planning and compromise by the super-
powers prevented this disaster and laid the foundation for future
arms control limitations. Although a continuing nemesis to'the inter-
national community, the threat of nuclear destruction has lessened
considerably since 1967 and has ceased to create front page head-
lines. However, within the past two years, during a time in which the
United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States have
made significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, the threat of
nuclear war once again made headline news. On August 2, 1990,
under the leadership of President Saddam Hussein, Iraq invaded, oc-
cupied, and annexed neighboring Kuwait.' This action served not
only to exacerbate regional instability, but also forced the United
States and the rest of the world to recognize and confront the threat
of nuclear proliferation in Iraq.
Over the past ten years, the Cold War which existed between
the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States
gradually came to an end under the leadership of President Bush
1. Kaysen, McNamara, & Rathjens, Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War, 1991 FOR-
EIGN AFF., at 95 [hereinafter Kaysen]. As quoted by President Truman in a State of the
Union address following the first hydrogen bomb test.
2. U.N. Sec. Council Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/Res/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
846 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution 687].
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and President Reagan, as well as Soviet President Gorbachev. As
evidence of this thaw, the world order has digressed from a bipolar
structure between two great ideological powers towards collective se-
curity and an international rule of law.'
Although the Commonwealth of Independent States may be de-
veloping five new strategic missile systems and will possess one of the
largest and most formidable land forces in Europe,4 the country
shows "no will to use its military power externally, and almost cer-
tainly lacks the political coherence to do so." '5 Experts such as Rob-
ert McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, believe that
"[e]ven the failure of perestroika and a retreat from glasnost led by
a new military-authoritarian regime would not reconstitute the pow-
erful, ideologically driven opponent . . . the United States saw from
1945 through much of the last decade." 6 However, amidst the
emerging detente between the superpowers, there exists a growing
problem of nuclear proliferation in Third World nations that threat-
ens to undermine the stability of the post Cold War era.
The technology necessary to construct nuclear weapons did not
remain within the confines of the developed world.7 Instead it spread
to developing nations whose political and economic regimes were
generally less stable than the great powers, but who had the same
inherent desire to possess a weapon of mass destruction for security
purposes. Information of outdated nuclear weapons became readily
available, and nuclear states aided Third World nations in acquiring
atomic power. Subsequently, India became the first developing na-
tion to "go nuclear," and its acquisition spurred other nations to seek
nuclear arsenals allegedly for defensive purposes.8 During roughly
the same time period of India's nuclearization, Israel instituted a nu-
3. Kaysen, supra note 1, at 101.
4. President George Bush, The Lessons of the Gulf War - Middle East Arms Control
Initiative, LVII, No. 17 Vital Speeches of the Day 514, 515 (1991) [hereinafter Lessons of
the Gulf War].
5. Kaysen, supra note. I, at 95.
6. Id.
7. Barnaby, Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat in the 1990's, Conflict
Studies 235, Oct/Nov. 1990, at 1, 3. The scientists, who designed the atomic bombs dropped
on Japan during World War II, did not keep the manufacturing process a secret. For example,
in a scientific journal, Amory B. Lovins, summarized the physics data necessary to construct a
nuclear weapon. Today, most university libraries have on their shelves literature describing the
bomb building process.
8. See generally E. LEFEVER, NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE THIRD WORLD (1979). India first
demonstrated nuclear capabilities on May 18, 1974. The bomb explosion shocked most West-
ern nations, including the United States, who was unaware of the significance of India's ad-
vancements. Id. at 25, 35. Following the test, India shelved the nuclear program and directed
research activities toward nuclear energy for civil purposes. Id. at 38. See generally L.
SPECTOR. THE UNDECLARED BOMB (1988). However during the 1980s, as tensions with Paki-
stan mounted, India rejected a proposed test ban treaty and strengthened its nuclear arsenals
by adding to its uranium stockpile. Id. at 96, 98.
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clear weapons program with the help of France.9 Although continu-
ing to deny her nuclear capabilities, experts widely acknowledge
Israel as a nuclear force.1" The alleged acquisition prompted other
Middle Eastern countries to initiate nuclear weapons programs to
balance the decisive threat which an armed Israel presented. Coun-
tries such as Iraq made calculated moves to acquire the equipment
and technology necessary to construct a nuclear stockpile.
Although Iraq informed the international community of her in-
tent to acquire nuclear capabilities, the extent of Iraq's program did
not begin to emerge until the advent of the Gulf crisis on August 2,
1990. The invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent confrontation be-
tween the allies and Iraq brought the issue of nuclear proliferation to
the forefront of international politics once again. Throughout the cri-
sis, the United Nations (UN) and the allied forces vocalized two
primary concerns regarding the use of nuclear arsenals. World lead-
ers feared not only that Iraq would construct a nuclear weapon
within the year and subsequently utilize it against the coalition, but
also that Israel would retaliate against a threatened Iraqi chemical
attack with nuclear weapons.
This Comment evaluates the UN's successes and failures in
eradicating these concerns. Section II provides an historical back-
ground of Iraq's quest for nuclear power. In Section III, the Com-
ment identifies the resolutions adopted by the UN requiring Iraq to
dismantle her nuclear weapons program. Section IV of this paper
examines Saddam Hussein's compliance (or lack thereof) with the
Security Council's Resolutions and analyzes the justifications as-
serted by Iraq's leader for non-compliance. The discoveries of the
UN inspection teams are enumerated in Section V, while Section VI
defines the methods available to the international community which
will ensure the destruction of Iraq's nuclear capabilities. Section VII
discusses the impact and implications which the Iraqi situation has
had and will continue to have on the UN's role in halting nuclear
proliferation. Although used primarily to facilitate the liberation of
Kuwait, the Gulf confrontation represented an opportunity not only
to destroy Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential, but also pro-
vided the means to lay the foundation for a movement towards a
Middle East peace."
9. See generally L. Spector, supra note 8. In 1956 France supplied Israel with a pluto-
nium reactor which was erected in Dimona. The reactor operated at full capacity by 1962
along with a plutonium processing plant which existed underground unbeknownst to IAEA
inspectors. Id. at 171. Some sources believe Israel had enough plutonium for a bomb by 1966
or 1967. Id. at 174. However, the United States still maintained in 1970 that Israel did not
have a nuclear processing plant. Id.
10. This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, April 1, 1990).
11. President George Bush, War With Iraq - Enforcing the U.N. Resolutions, LVII, No.
8 Vital Speeches of the Day 226 (1991) [hereinafter War With Iraq].
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II. Iraq's Nuclear Heritage
As a signatory member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
Iraq renounced nuclear weapons and agreed to accept a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
covering her nuclear facilities.12 Despite pledges to limit their pursuit
of nuclear energy to those technologies utilized for peaceful and le-
gitimate purposes, Iraq continued her quest for the nuclear bomb in
response to the Israeli threat.
Prior to 1981, Iraq acquired three nuclear reactors and enough
enriched uranium to make one nuclear bomb.13 However, on June 7,
1981, Israel nullified Iraq's advances by destroying the country's
largest nuclear reactor.14 Israel justified the Osirak attack with an
allegation that scientists intended to use the facility to produce nu-
clear weapons materials.'6 Ignoring these claims, the United States
State Department and the IAEA denounced the raid. 6 Following
the Osirak incident, Iraq's nuclear program - peaceful or otherwise -
came to an abrupt halt.17
Although forced to abandon the active pursuit of nuclear tech-
12. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2 Dispatch 12 (1991) [hereinafter
Fact Sheet]. Since July 1, 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has
been "the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." Id. In
addition, the treaty purports to foster peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards and en-
courages negotiations aimed at general disarmament. Today, over one hundred forty countries,
including Iraq, have become parties to the NPT.
The treaty divides nations into two groups: countries detonating bombs prior to 1967 and
'non-nuclear states. Nuclear weapon states pledge not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state in
acquiring arsenals. The NPT obligates nations which do not have nuclear weapons to refrain
from manufacturing or acquiring the bombs. Article III provides for the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply international safeguards to existing nuclear facilities so as to
detect and deter illegitimate activities. The Article also places safeguards on nuclear materials
and equipment exported to non-nuclear states. In Article IV, the treaty not only recognizes the
rights of member states to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but facilitates
these advancements by providing for "the fullest possible exchanges of equipment, materials,
and information." Id. Under the treaty, members hold a review conference every five years. In
1995 parties will meet to decide whether to extend the NPT beyond its initial twenty-five year
limit. Id.
13. Barnaby, Arms Control After the Gulf War, Conflict Studies 240, April 1991, at 1,
9. In 1968 the Commonwealth of Independent States provided Iraq with a reactor. Subse-
quently France, both in 1976 and again in 1980, sold reactors to the state. In addition, at the
time of sale both countries supplied Iraq with highly enriched uranium to utilize as fuel in the
reactors. Scientists could use this uranium in the manufacture of an atomic bomb.
14. See generally A. CORDESMAN, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (1991). In addition
to attacking the reactor, Israel attempted to eliminate Iraq's nuclear program by assassinating
Dr. Yahya el Maeshan, an Egyptian physicist employed by the Iraqi government, and through
numerous bombings which destroyed French and Italian companies employed by Saddam Hus-
scin. Id. at 97.
15. Weiss, Tighten Up On Nuclear Cheaters, The Bull. of Atomic Scientists, May 1991,
at II.
16. Id.
17. Albright & Hibbs, Iraq and the Bomb. Were They Even Close?, The Bull. of
Atomic Scientists, Mar. 1991, at 16, 22 [hereinafter Albright]. Israel's attack closed off a
potential plutonium route to the bomb and as a result of decreasing oil revenues, Iraq lacked
the financial resources to immediately rebuild the program.
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nology, Iraq never retracted her assertion to acquire nuclear weapons
as compensation for Israel's arsenals.1 8 Ironically, after the attack,
Iraq received both sympathy and technological support for a legiti-
mate nuclear program.19 In 1987 Saddam Hussein "got serious"
about acquiring the bomb by forming two organizations responsible
for the procurement and development of his clandestine program. Al
Quqaa State Establishment, located near Baghdad, developed non-
nuclear components of nuclear weapons, while Nassr State Enter-
prise fostered the nuclear enrichment program. 0 Simultaneous to
the creation of these organizations, Saddam Hussein made calcu-
lated steps to import the equipment and technology vital to nuclear
research which was not available within Iraq.
Regrettably, many of the industrialized nations must assume
partial responsibility for the rapid advancements in Iraq's nuclear
program. Iraq's covert attempts to import nuclear technology gained
world wide publicity on April 4, 1990, ,when the United States Cus-
toms Service, in conjunction with the British government, arrested
five individuals attempting to smuggle capacitors from CSI Technol-
ogies, a California corporation, to Iraq." In a related incident, cus-
toms officials later revealed that three scientists from the Al Quqaa
State Establishment, while attending a detonation physics sympo-
sium in Portland, Oregon, inquired as to the availability of kry-
trons.22 Despite both the overt and covert activities undertaken by
Iraq in an attempt to procure equipment and technology, experts
predicted that Saddam Hussein would have to wait several years to
acquire nuclear arsenals.
Pursuant to the attack at Osirak and Israel's allegations, Iraq
voluntarily requested that the IAEA increase the frequency of the
agency's visits to Iraq, presumably to add credence to Saddam Hus-
sein's claims of a legitimate nuclear program.2" During the past sev-
eral years, IAEA representatives went to Iraq every six months to
ensure the peaceful use of the country's small amount of enriched
uranium.24 In addition, inspections were made at various nuclear re-
18. Id. On French television President Hussein announced that "[H]e would see no
problem in Western nations helping [him] to develop nuclear arms to help compensate for
those owned by Israel." Id. at 16.
19. Ten Years Ago in the Bulletin, The Bull. of Atomic Scientists, Oct. 1991, at 5
[hereinafter Ten Years Ago].
20. Id. at 17.
21. Albright, supra note 17, at 19, 20. Intelligence agencies linked the smugglers with
the Al Quqaa State Establishment, the top secret facility responsible for developing missiles
and explosives.. The smuggled capacitors could have been used in the detonation devices' of
nuclear weapons.
22. Thomas, Saddam's Nuclear Secrets, NEWSWEEK. Oct. 7, 1991, at 28, 34. An inter-
nal memo circulated at the Department of Energy described the conference as "The place you
want to be. . .if you were a potential nuclear weapons proliferant." Id.
23. Weiss,.supra note 15, at 12.
24. Blix, The A-Bomb Squad, World Monitor, Nov. 1991, at 18, 19.
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actors, each indicating that Iraqi nuclear activities remained within
the legitimate framework established by the NPT. Accordingly, the
IAEA inspectors labeled Saddam Hussein's cooperation with the
Treaty as "exemplary. 25
Despite assurances about the peaceful nature of Iraq's research,
the United States remained concerned about the growing threat of
nuclear proliferation in Iraq. Therefore, the coalition welcomed the
attempt which the Gulf conflict provided to rid the region of a nu-
clear nemesis. On January 16, 1991, President Bush announced that
the liberation of Kuwait had begun."6 Simultaneously he vowed "to
knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. '2 7 Later that
month, the President confidently assured the American public that:
"Our pinpoint attacks have put Saddam Hussein out of the nuclear
bomb building business for a long time to come."2
III. The United Nations Securance of Non-Proliferation
Although secure with the destruction of Iraq's nuclear infra-
structure, the coalition realized that "Saddam Hussein is a pariah
who will, if given the opportunity, reconsolidate his dictatorship and
military machine [and] further brutalize the Iraqi populace, and
threaten our allies in the region. '"29 The Iraqi President's vow to
"one day strike back at its enemies and that its capability to do so
would be reconstructed" gave further evidence of the need for addi-
tional vigilance.3" In the wake of these threats, the coalition recog-
nized the necessity of a monitoring system not only to ensure that
Iraq did not attempt to rebuild its nuclear program by salvaging re-
maining equipment and technology, but also to provide regional sta-
bility in the hopes of laying the foundation for a Middle East peace.
This responsibility fell to the UN.
The UN continues to play an unprecedented role in the Gulf
crisis. Each of its declarations and resolutions manifests an "encour-
aging lesson in what the organized international community can
achieve when it acts in unison under the UN Charter."31 One of the
most eloquent tributes recognizing the significant role played by the
UN during the crisis came from the Amir of Kuwait in a letter di-
rected to the Secretary General on March 5, 1991:
25. Weiss, supra note 15, at 11.
26. War With Iraq, supra note 11, at 226.
27. Id.
28. Albright & Hibbs, Iraq's Nuclear Hide-and-Seek, The Bull. of Atomic Scientists,
Sept. 1991, at 14 [hereinafter Hibbs].
29. Kelly, Recent Developments in the Middle East, 2 DISPATCH 459 (1991).
30. Bolton, Iraqi Non-Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions, 2 DISPATCH
545, 546.
31. Blix, supra note 24, at 21.
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Despite the overwhelming disaster that has befallen Ku-
wait, we now find some comfort in the fact that the international
unity that came into being to repel the aggression has strength-
ened the position of the UN as an effective international
organization. 2
A. The Cease Fire - Resolution 687
In order to balance its goal of securing non-proliferation in Iraq
with the challenge of providing regional stability, the UN "estab-
lished new practical security mechanisms that point the way for the
international community to maintain the peace in the future." 3 On
April 3, 1991, the UN Security Council, in a vote of twelve to one,
passed Resolution 687 which provides for a formal cease fire between
Iraq and the allied coalition. 4 According to President Bush, the Res-
olution not only compensates Kuwait for Iraq's aggression, but also
includes provisions designed to ensure Iraq cannot rebuild its
military strength to threaten anew the peace of the region.
Weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them are
to be destroyed, this is to be confirmed by on site inspection. 5
Sections of the Resolution deal with various issues such as: creating
an international boundary and demilitarized zone between Iraq and
Kuwait, providing for the return of all Kuwaiti property annexed by
Iraq, securing Iraq's financial responsibility for foreign debts, and
demanding the country's cooperation with the International Red
Cross in returning Kuwaiti and other Third World nationals.3
Two Sections of the Resolution deal specifically with weapons of
mass destruction.' In addition to demanding a reaffirmation of
32. Resolution 687: supra note 2, at 14.
33. Bolton, supra note 30, at 546.
34. Fact Sheet: UN Security Council Resolution 687 - Cease-Fire in the Gulf, 2 DiS-
PATCH 234 (1991). Cuba voted against Resolution 687, while Yemen and Ecuador abstained.
35. Statement on Resolution 687 by President Bush, 2 DISPATCH 235 (1991).
36. U.N. Sec. Council Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/Res/687, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 846
(1991).
37. Id. at 6. The text of paragraphs in Resolution 687 providing for the dismantling of
Iraq's nuclear weapons program are as follows:
11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of I July 1968;
12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nu-
clear weapons or nuclear-weapons usable-material or any subsystems or compo-
nents or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related
to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the
present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items
specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the
exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, with the assistance and cooperatiorf of the Special Commission as pro-
vided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9(b)
above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph
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Iraq's obligations to refrain from using chemical warfare and provid-
ing for the destruction or removal of all chemical and biological
weapons, Resolution 687 implements a plan to render Iraq's nuclear
weapons program inoperable. Initially the Security Council "invites"
Iraq to unconditionally reaffirm its adherence to the NPT.s8 In doing
so, the UN hopes to reinforce Iraq's legal and moral obligations
under this Treaty which requires signatories to refrain from develop-
ing any nuclear technology beyond the scope of peaceful activities.
To ensure compliance, the UN also mandates that Iraq uncondition-
ally agree to neither acquire nor develop nuclear weapons, weapons
material, or any subsystems, components, or research pertaining to
the construction of such weapons or materials.3 9 The terms of the
cease-fire require a submission by Iraq to the Secretary General and
the Director General of the IAEA adopting the Resolution and iden-
tifying the locations and amounts of these items."' Subsequently, the
weapons and materials will be placed in the possession of the IAEA,
who will assume responsibility for their disposal. To guarantee Iraq's
adherence to the disarmament requirements, Resolution 687 provides
for the development of a Special Commission to carry out inspec-
tions of Iraq's nuclear capabilities.4 1
The Commission, ultimately created and adopted under Resolu-
tion 699, passed on June 17, 1991, represents an unprecedented com-
bined effort between the UN and the IAEA to render Iraq's nuclear
infrastructure harmless. 2 The task which the inspectors have under-
13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering
harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan dis-
cussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification
of its compliance with these undertakings;
13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
through the Secretary General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Spe-
cial Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in para-
graph 9(b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear
capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional
locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the
Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or
rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to
carry out the plan within forty five days following approval by the Security
Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of
Iraq under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July
1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance
with paragraph 12 above; including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq
subject to the Agency's verification and inspections of the International Atomic
Energy Agency to confirm that the Agency's safeguards cover all relevant nu-
clear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval
within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. id.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Resolution 699, U.N. SCOR (plen. mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/699 (1991).
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taken is a formidable one. As journalist Jim Wurst noted, the Com-
mission "is attempting to do. . .what 90,000 tons of allied bombs
could not do: disarm Iraq" '43 under trying political circumstances,
without adequate funding, or proper equipment. 4 The inspection
teams, composed of approximately twenty-one experts and a ten to
fifteen member support staff, began on site inspections in May,
1991."5 Until this time, the Commission relied primarily on the Iraqi
and United States governments for information regarding the state
of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program. Under Resolution
687, the Special Commission carries out on site inspections of Iraq's
nuclear -facilities based on the country's formal declarations as re-
quired under the cease fire terms. 6 However, as a result of Saddam
Hussein's history of deceit, the UN granted the Commission prece-
dent setting authority to designate additional locations for
inspection.4 7
Resolution 687 may be "the most Draconian resolution ever
passed by the Security Council against a Member State."" For the
first time in history, the UN utilized "clear cut and internationally
approved military and political action" to decisively block an existing
effort to acquire nuclear capabilities."9 The Security Council cites
several reasons to justify the adoption of stringent cease-fire terms.
First, member states expressed concern over frequent reports alleg-
ing Iraq's attempts to acquire materials for a nuclear weapons pro-
gram. Incidents such as the smuggling operation discovered in 1990,
serve to provide credence to these allegations.5" Secondly, the UN
believes that Iraq's disarmament will further the establishment of a
nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. 1 Finally, the Security
Council, recognizing the enormous threat which the presence of nu-
clear weapons in Iraq poses to world peace and security, believes a
weapons free Iraq will increase regional stability and provide the
43. Wurst, U.N. Commission Sifts Through Rubble, The Bull. of Atomic Scientists,
Sept. 1991, at 10.
44. Id. Despite the numerous assignments the Special Commission received, the UN
only allocated $35 million for the teams. Moreover, the technology which the inspectors need
to conduct thorough investigations "barely exists." Id.
45. Id. at 10, 11.
46. Resolution 687, supra note 2, at 6.
47. Id.
48. Kemp, The Middle East Arms Race: Can It Be Controlled, 45 THE MIDDLE E. J.
441, 447.
49. Bundy, Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf, 1991 FOREIGN AFF. 83, 89. Israel's unilat-
eral attack on Osirak represents the only other overt attempt to decisively block a country's
acquisition of nuclear arms. However, in contrast to the current sanctions, the international
community condemned Israel's aggression and ignored its justification that Iraq was pursuing
a nuclear weapons program.
50. Albright, supra note 17, at 19, 20.
51. Resolution 687, supra note 2, at 2.
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foundation upon which to build a Middle East peace."2
In drafting terms to halt the proliferation of nonconventional
weapons, the Council had the difficult task of balancing these objec-
tives with Iraq's legitimate need and right to self defense. To pre-
serve Iraq's right to self defense as guaranteed by the UN Charter,5"
the Council did not implement a permanent arms embargo against
Iraq nor did Resolution 687 require the destruction of conventional
arms. 64 Following a meeting of the five permanent members of the
Security Council on July 9, 1991, the representatives issued a state-
ment acknowledging that:
The transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a re-
sponsible manner, should contribute to the ability of states to
meet their legitimate defence, security, and national sovereignty
requirements and to participate effectively in collective measures
requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining
or restoring international peace and security."5
Although Resolution 687 signified a "growing political trend
that weapons of mass destruction should be curtailed and elimi-
nated," resulting in "a stronger and sharper control regime," the
measure was not independently sufficient to produce immediate re-
sults. 56 Therefore, in Resolution 699, the Security Council reaffirmed
the Special Commission's authority to conduct all activities under
Section C of Resolution 687 and held Iraq liable for the costs in-
curred in the implementation of the Resolutions.57 Ironically, the
Gulf War provided the coalition not only with a means to eradicate
the Iraqi nuclear threat, but also a way to defray the cost.
Due to Saddam Hussein's continuing non-compliance with the
cease-fire terms, the Security Council unanimously enacted Resolu-
52. Id.
53. U.N. Charter art. 51.
54. Resolution 687, supra note 2, at 8.
55. Statement Issued After the Meeting of the Five on Arms Transfer and Non-
Proliferation, 2 DISPATCH 508 (1991).
56. Wurst, supra note 43, at 10. As quoted by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of Sweden.
57. Resolution 699, supra note 42, at 1, 2. The applicable text of Resolution 699 is as
follows:
2. Confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have the authority to
conduct activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991), for the purpose of
the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in
paragraphs 8 and 12 of that resolution, after the 45-day period following the
approval of this plan until such activities have been completed; ...
4. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and kind, from all
Member States to ensure that activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991)
are undertaken effectively and expeditiously; further decides, however, that the
Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of carrying out the tasks
authorized by section C; and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the
Council within 30 days for approval recommendations as to the most effective
means by which Iraq's obligations in this respect may be fulfilled.
[Vol. 10:3
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tion 707 on August 15, 1991, reaffirming Iraq's obligations to the
international community and demanding acquiescence. 8 Specifi-
cally, the UN received letters on June 26, 1991, from the Executive
Chairman of the Special Commission and the Director of the IAEA,
reporting incomplete notifications of concealed activities and Iraq's
unwillingness to comply with "undertakings relating to the privi-
leges, immunities and facilities to be accorded to the Special Com-
mission and the IAEA inspection teams." '59 Acknowledging that the
actions constituted a material breach of Iraq's international obliga-
tions, the Council condemned not only Saddam Hussein's breach of
Resolution 687, but also his flagrant disregard for his country's obli-
gations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA - a viola-
tion of the NPT. Resolution 707 demanded full compliance with
Section C of Resolution 687, including the full disclosure of all as-
pects of the nuclear weapons program; the granting to the Special
Commission of immediate and unrestricted access to any and all des-
ignated areas; the freedom to utilize fixed wing and helicopter flights
throughout Iraq; and finally, the cessation of all nuclear activities
except those related to medical, agricultural, or industrial
objectives.60
IV. Iraq's Adherence to the United Nations Resolutions.
On April 6, 1991, Iraq reluctantly accepted the cease fire terms
and accordingly promised a full disclosure of her nuclear program by
July 25, 1991.61 Iraq made her first declaration on April 18, 1991,
claiming that the country did not have any prohibited items because
allied bombs destroyed the fissionable material.6 2 This seemingly
conclusive statement was only the first of five successive declarations
by Iraq in the months following the cease-fire.6" Each subsequent
statement revealed a more comprehensive program than previously
admitted. Iraq's formal compliance with the UN Resolutions was
and may continue to be a sham. In reality, Saddam Hussein's "nu-
clear ambition, combined with his addiction to trickery, led him to a
posture of pretended cooperation that was intended to conceal a con-
tinuing effort to get something, however crude and imperfect, that
would make a bang."'6 4
58. U.N. Sec. Council Res. 707, U.N. Doc. S/Res/707 (1991) [hereinafter Resolution
707].
59. Id. at 646.
60. Id. at 645, 646.
61. Hibbs, supra note 28, at 15.
62. IRAQ COUNTRY REPORT 14 (No. 2 1991).
63. Nightline: How Close Iraq Came To the Bomb and Who Helped (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 17, 1991) [hereinafter How Close Iraq Came].
64. Bundy, supra note 49, at 89.
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A. Lack of Compliance
Thus far, Iraq has exemplified its lack of compliance with the
Resolutions through major newsworthy events in addition to a gen-
eral non-cooperative posture. The first incident occurred during the
second inspection team's visit to Iraq."6 The Commission directed its
investigation towards undeclared nuclear sites pursuant to their
power under Paragraph 13 of Resolution 687.66 Based on informa-
tion received from United States Intelligence, the inspectors visited
Abu Gharib military barracks on June 23, 1991, and Fallujah on
June 28, 1991, hoping to find evidence of nuclear weapons re-
search . 7 Iraqi soldiers denied the team access to both facilities. A
three day standoff ensued at Abu Gharib between the team and
Iraq, during which time soldiers moved calutrons, utilized for ura-
nium enrichment, away from the site."8 A more serious and threaten-
ing incident occurred on June 28, 1991 at Fallujah when soldiers not
only denied the Commission access to the facilities, but also fired
warning shots over the inspectors' heads.69 Although useful in sup-
porting claims of a clandestine nuclear program, the confrontations
more importantly illustrate Iraq's intense desire to preserve those nu-
clear weapon's components spared destruction during allied
bombings.
Based on a tip from an unnamed intelligence agency, a sixth
inspection team was formed to search a building in central Baghdad.
Believing the facility to be Iraq's nuclear design center, the team
arrived on September 23, 1991, hoping to find conclusive evidence of
Iraq's covert effort directed at the manufacture of nuclear arsenals.
Although Iraqi soldiers moved a majority of the documents detailing
the program before inspectors arrived, the team did recover four
steel trunks containing numerous records."
On September 24, 1991, Iraq arrested and detained the investi-
gators for ninety-two hours in a parking lot.71 The incident which
sparked international response, including a threat of military action
from President Bush on behalf of the allied forces, illustrates the
volatile situation existing in Iraq. Despite formal compliance with
65. Nuclear Weapons in Iraq: Capitol Hill Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee About the Middle East, Federal News Service (Oct. 17, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Current file) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons in Iraq]. The second inspection team vis-
ited Iraq from June 22 to July 3, 1991.
66. Resolution 687, supra note 2, at 6.
67. Hibbs, supra note 28, at 17.
68. Id.
69. Id. Soldiers fired the shots when members of the inspection team attempted to pho-
tograph a convoy of sixty to eighty trucks, visibly filled with materials and equipment, leaving
the site.
70. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1991, at A6, col. 1.
71. Id.
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the Resolutions, Saddam Hussein continues to search for ways to
withhold information, materials, and equipment from the inspection
teams, and as this situation indicates, he willingly risks a guaranteed
military strike to preserve his nuclear program. At roughly the same
time as the hostage situation, Iraq also questioned the right of the
teams to fly their own helicopters and fixed wing planes during in-
spections as dictated by Resolution 707.71 Eventually, as a result of
pressure applied by the Security Council, Iraq acquiesced to their
use. Once again, however, Iraq resorted to threats of violence to en-
sure the protection of its weapons program.
These incidents are only three examples of the numerous decep-
tion techniques employed by the Iraqi government in an attempt to
circumvent the UN Resolutions, thus preserving a nuclear weapons
program. In addition, Iraqi soldiers bulldozed vital facilities; filed se-
rial numbers from equipment used in the covert program; and with
epoxy paint, defeated the sampling measures employed by the in-
spection teams. 73 Despite her pledged compliance with the cease-fire
terms, Iraq never intended to part with her nuclear advances, which
were the products of billions of dollars in oil revenues. Saddam Hus-
sein sought only to evade the Resolutions in a manner similar to the
means used to deceive IAEA inspectors for the past decade.
B. Justifications for Non-compliance
Iraq's lack of compliance with the UN's Resolutions should not
come as a shock to the international community. On April 6, 1991,
the date upon which Iraq reluctantly accepted Resolution 687, Sad-
dam Hussein expressed his intense dissatisfaction with the stringent
requirements describing them as "unjust, iniquitous and vengeful
measures."74 As information continued to surface providing concrete
evidence of a clandestine program, Iraq's leader persevered in his
onslaught against the Resolutions, searching for rationales to justify
his non-compliance and alleging numerous reasons why the Commis-
sion should not destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
72. Resolution 707, supra note 58, at 644. The applicable text of Resolution 707 is as
follows:
Demands that Iraq
(v) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams to
conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant
purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and lo-
gistics without interference of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as
may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make full use of their
own aircraft and such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most appropri-
ate for the work of the Commission.
Id.
73. L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1991, at A12, col. 3.
74. Resolution 687, supra note 2, at 6.
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1. The Israeli Threat.-As the primary justification for sal-
vaging the nuclear weapons program, Saddam Hussein cites the
threat which a nuclear armed Israel poses not only to Iraq, but to
the entire Middle East region. Despite Israel's formal position that
"it is not a nuclear weapon state and will not be the first to introduce
these weapons into the region,""' a majority of experts feel reasona-
bly certain that Israel possesses nuclear arsenals. Most Arab nations,
including Iraq, believe-that Israel's nuclear capabilities provide a de-
cisive advantage despite the fact that other countries in the region
have many times Israel's population, higher birth rates, and greater
oil wealth.76
. Neither the size of a military presence nor financial resources
available for conventional weapons can match the deterrent power
found in nuclear armed missiles. Adding credence to their argument,
Iraq cites Israel's unprovoked unilateral attack on Osirak which "de-
stroyed [their] peaceful nuclear reactor" as evidence that compliance
with the NPT does not ensure protection from a nuclear armed
power.77 Denied weapons of mass destruction, Iraq alleges it will be-
come a "sitting duck" at the mercy of a hostile Arab neighbor. 8
2. Violations of National Sovereignty.-In addition to
presenting the threat which a nuclear armed Israel poses as justifica-
tion for non-compliance, Saddam Hussein insists that UN investiga-
tions have become never ending search and destroy missions which
constitute an "unprecedented assault on the sovereignty and rights of
his country. ' 79 According to Iraq, the Resolutions represent a means
for the international community to place Iraq under a trusteeship, in
a manner similar to that invoked during the preindustrial era.80 Ab-
dul Amir Al-Anbari, the Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, claims that
the inspection teams "are occupying the country by remote control
and. . .physical occupation" in an attempt to achieve domination.8
Iraq further alleges that the Commission deliberately exaggerates
the extent of nuclear research, furthering a blackmail campaign "to
create a justification for an aggression on Iraq and [to] maintain the
economic blockade." 82 Iraq even argues that the UN utilizes the
cease-fire terms as a means to steal Iraq's nuclear program so as to
deprive all Third World nations of advanced technologies to ensure
75. Bundy, supra note 49, at 92.
76. Kaysen, supra note 1, at 102.
77. Nightline: How Close Iraq Came, supra note 63.
78. Kemp, supra note 48, at 453.
79. Resolution 687, supra note 2, at 6.
80. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1991, at A7, col, 1.
81. How Close Iraq Came, supra note 63.
82. Iraq Denies It Tried to Produce Nuclear Weapon Component, Reuters Library Re-
port (Oct. 10, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file).
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maintenance of the status quo.8
In addition to citing the oppressive and invasive nature of the
UN and its Resolutions, Iraq asserts that the United States in par-
ticular utilizes the Gulf Crisis as an excuse to gain control over the
country and to "subject Iraq and the Iraqi people to US colonial
tutelage. '84 Saddam Hussein believes the inspection teams are dis-
proportionately composed of American experts,8 5 thereby providing
the United States with the means and the authority necessary to re-
build Iraq in a manner conducive to American political objectives.
However, whether alleging domination by the international commu-
nity as a whole or by the United States acting independently, Iraq
firmly believes that the UN Resolutions and the inspection teams
working under UN authority, constitute an unprecedented invasion
of national sovereignty and deny Iraq her right to self determination.
Iraqi leaders feel they should not be expected to comply with resolu-
tions which ensure third party control of the state.
3. A Double Standard.-Iraqi officials charge the UN with
enacting a double standard by requiring Iraq to dismantle her nu-
clear weapons program while providing other nations with greater
latitude in pursuing nuclear. research. Once again, Iraq cites Israel's
advancements, arguing that the United States, who claims to be so
vehemently opposed to nuclear proliferation, exported materials to
Israel for use in their developing program.86 Moreover, the interna-
tional community unquestionably accepts Israel's denials of nuclear
power despite concrete evidence to the contrary. Even those powers
which do acknowledge the probability of a nuclear armed Israel have
not directed the country to become a full signatory member of the
NPT and continue to apply limited safeguard requirements to
Israel's program. In arguing a double standard, Iraq also alleges the
inspection teams have unduly scrutinized and highlighted minimal
quantities of undeclared nuclear materials in Iraq when other na-
tions routinely produce small amounts of enriched plutonium and
uranium for test operations without commanding invasive inspections
by the IAEA. 7 Finally, Iraq questions the willingness of other na-
tions to accept the plan enacted by the UN. Officials debate the in-
83. Hibbs & MacLachlan, AYE Condemns Baghdad Again As Iraq Protests 'Double
Standard', Nucleonics Week (September 26, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file)
(hereinafter MacLachlan].
84. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1991, at A6, col. As quoted by Ambassador Abdul Amir
Anbari.
85. Wurst, supra note 43, at 11.
86. MacLachlan, supra note 83, at 12. Iraq also claims that the IAEA ignored a forty-
one ton shipment from uranium for Luxembourg to Israel in 1985. However, evidence later
revealed that Israel used to material for aircraft manufacturing rather than nuclear explosives.
87. Id. at 12.
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ternational community's need to gain insight about Iraq's intentions
for a revitalized nuclear program when "no government on earth an-
nounces its future plans in nuclear energy."88
C. Arguments for Compliance
Although acknowledging that nuclear arsenals provide deterrent
power for Israel, the UN does not believe the weapons pose the seri-
ous threat which Saddam Hussein asserts as justification for non-
compliance. Admittedly, Israel is one of the primary players in the
Middle East conflict, and the UN has openly sought to create a nu-
clear weapons free zone in the region for several years. 9 For the
present time, however, and until the Arab nations reach a Middle
East peace, the international community permits Israel to maintain
her alleged nuclear arsenals on the basis of past prudence and a for-
mal declaration promising not to introduce the weapons into regional
conflicts. 90 Supporting this position, the UN can cite Israel's willing-
ness to forego a retaliatory nuclear strike in response to alleged Iraqi
chemical warfare and the actual attacks by SCUD missiles during
the Gulf conflict. Israel's position during the war added credence to
her promises and defused the threat that a nuclear armed Israel
presented to the Middle East region at this time.
Members of the Special Commission openly admit to the intru-
sive nature of the inspection regime; the Resolutions provide the
teams with unlimited access to any Iraqi facility allegedly connected
with the covert nuclear program. In drafting the Resolutions, the Se-
curity Council attempted to balance Iraq's national sovereignty and
right to self defense with the immediate threat a nuclear armed Iraq
presented to regional and world security. The cease-fire terms pro-
vided Iraq with an opportunity to both declare its nuclear program
and to submit an inventory of all equipment and materials utilized in
research. Arguably, had Saddam Hussein complied with the terms,
the inspection teams would not have been forced to resort to search
88. How Close Iraq Came, supra note 63.
89. Barnaby, supra note 7, at 10. Since 1974, the General Assembly regularly adopts a
Resolution entitled: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East. The
Resolution
: . 'urges all parties directly concerned to consider taking steps required for the
implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the
region of the Middle East and, as a means of promoting the objective, invites
them to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); calls upon all
countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the
zone, to agree to place all of their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards; to
declare their support for establishing such a zone, and depositing these declara-
tions with the Security Council; and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territo-
ries under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Id.
90. Bundy, supra note 49, at 92.
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and destroy missions in an attempt to discover hidden programs.
Iraq's leaders made a conscious decision not to carry out their for-
mal acquiescence to the cease-fire terms and, therefore, must be sub-
ject to invasive inspections. In addition, the Resolutions did not re-
quire the destruction of Iraq's conventional weapons, thus, the UN
did not deprive the State of its guaranteed right to self defense. By
enacting measures that dismantled Iraq's weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the Security Council sought only to remove peace threatening
weapons from a country and, more specifically, from a leader who
has consistently evidenced irrational tendencies. Iraq's previous ac-
tions legitimize the aggressive posture adopted by the Security
Council.
Many nations believe that even if the Resolutions deprive Iraq
of national sovereignty and her right to self defense, the UN can
justify these measures in light of the barbaric and deceptive prac-
tices utilized by the State before, during, and after the Gulf conflict.
Prior to the discovery of concrete evidence proving the existence of a
clandestine program, Iraq maintained she had not conducted any il-
legitimate nuclear research. Even after the inspection teams docu-
mented the existence of a nuclear program beyond the scope permit-
ted by the NPT, Iraqi leaders insisted that scientists conducted
research solely for peaceful purposes despite expert opinions that the
program undeniably had military objectives.91 In the history of nu-
clear proliferation, no other nation has resorted to the extensive mea-
sures taken by Iraq to divert attention from its military objectives.
Without invasive resolutions like 687, neither the Middle East nor
the world is safe from an Iraqi nuclear threat. The magnitude of this
danger, in light of Iraq's past actions, is one which the international
community cannot tolerate and, therefore, must eliminate despite the
imposition of admittedly inequitable standards and minor infringe-
ments of Iraq's rights.
V. Iraq's Nuclear Program
A. The United Nations Inspection Teams' Findings
Despite Saddam Hussein's formidable attempts to circumvent
the Resolutions, the inspection teams, which have thus far visited
Iraq, have gathered conclusive evidence of a clandestine nuclear pro-
91. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1991, at A7, col. I. Until the week of Oct. 20, 1991, Iraqi
leaders continued to make statements that:
their official nuclear program amounted to research into peaceful uses of atomic
energy." After inspectors discovered more evidence of a clandestine program,
officials modified their claims insisting the program "intended only to have them
ready in case a political decision was taken to go forward with a bomb program.
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gram which could have produced a bomb in the near future as well
as additional weapons by 1995.92 Despite claims by President Bush
and General Schwarzkopf that air attacks had "destroyed all
[Iraq's] nuclear reactor facilities" and "neutralized . . . nuclear
manufacturing capibilit[ies]," the allied forces failed to discover and
destroy the nerve center of Saddam Hussein's program.93 One Penta-
gon official admitted:
We can bomb all we want, but we'll never get all Iraq's
material and equipment by bombing. We can use bombing as a
technique to punish Saddam or scare him. But when the dust
settles, you still could have some material left plus the nuclear
experts.9
In late July 1991 the inspection teams initially discovered the
existence of a far reaching nuclear program that the Iraqi govern-
ment supported. Until this time, the Commission relied solely on na-
tional intelligence agencies to provide information regarding Iraq's
program - the same agencies, who before the Gulf crisis, believed
Saddam Hussein pursued only legitimate nuclear activities. When
Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, the Deputy Chairman of Iraq's Energy Commis-
sion and Deputy Minister of Industry and Minerals, interrupted an
interrogation session to speak about equipment crucial to the produc-
tion of enriched uranium, the inspectors suddenly realized the extent
to which the international community underestimated Iraq's inten-
tions to acquire nuclear technology.95
The findings of the Special Commission indicate that the Iraqi
program was comparable in ambition and scope to the Manhattan
Project."' Like the United States, Iraq had pursued several different
paths of research. In contrast to the United States, however, the
country explored them simultaneously. Experts describe Saddam's
program as parallel, broad scoped, and very sophisticated. 97
In May 1991 the first inspection team encouragingly verified the
existence of previously safeguarded materials. 8 As the inspections
continued, however, the teams discovered two grams of separated
plutonium and over three times the amount of enriched uranium
92. MacLachlan, supra note 83.
93. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al, col. 3, A9, col. 4.
94. Hibbs, supra note 28, at 23.
95. Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1991, at Al, col. 1. Later the United Nations (UN) confirmed
that Dr. Jaffar had "the lead technical and administrative responsibility for the nuclear pro-
gram as a whole .... " During the 1970s, he had become one of the two major scientific
figures involved in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Id.
96. L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1991, at Al, col 2. The Manhattan Project consisted of the
scientific research which produced the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II.
97. How Close Iraq Came, supra note 63.
98. Nuclear Weapons in Iraq, supra note 65.
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originally predicted.9 9 Later, from June 22 to July 3, 1991, the sec-
ond inspection team utilized its power under Resolution 687 to ex-
amine undeclared sites. Photographs of soldiers removing materials,
equipment, other evidence from the facilities substantiated claims of
an undeclared uranium enrichment program. 100 Subsequent inspec-
tions revealed two additional enrichment programs and the nerve
centers of Saddam Hussein's research, at which he intended "to de-
sign and produce a nuclear device."101 One of the facilities, Al-
Atheer, which intelligence agencies linked to the weapons program
only one week before the end of the conflict, suffered only minor
damage during allied bombings. 0 2 Furat, the other location, as-
sumed to be a general industrial center, but in reality, used for ura-
nium enrichment through gas centrifuge, escaped the conflict
unharmed.103
Despite the accumulation of evidence suggesting the existence
of a clandestine nuclear program, the inspectors did not obtain con-
crete proof of a deliberate campaign by Iraq to design and build
nuclear weapons until the sixth inspection team went to Iraq from
September 23 to September 28, 1991. During their visit, inspectors
recovered 25,000 pages of documents, nineteen hours of videotape
and 700 films detailing Iraq's program. 0 4 In addition, the raid re-
vealed the horrifying scope of Iraq's research and advances in Pe-
trochemical Three, a code name for the nuclear program."' The
Commission also discovered evidence that Iraq's scientists attempted
to produce a hydrogen bomb. 06 Inspectors reached this conclusion
based on documentation regarding Lithium 6, a fusion element pri-
marily used in the manufacture of bombs.07
One of the team's most important discoveries was a list of sup-
pliers who exported equipment, materials, and technology to Iraq.
Although the UN restricted disclosure of the specific corporations
involved to those governments who requested the information, mem-
bers of the inspection teams asserted that practically every Western
99. Hibbs, supra note 28, at 22.
100. Id. at 17.
101. N.Y. Times, supra note 93, at Al, col. 3.
102. Id. Allied bombing missions succeeded in destroying only 15% of the AI-Atheer
complex.
103. Two Iraqi Nuclear Sites Survived Gulf War, The Reuters Library Report (Oct.
10, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file).
104. U.N. Inspector Says Iraq Could Rebuild Nuclear Programme, The Reuters Li-
brary Report (Oct. 2, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file) [hereinafter U.N. Inspector].
105. N.Y.Times, supra note 93.
106. Iraq Said Working On Hydrogen Weapon As Well As A-Bomb, The Reuters Li-
brary Report (Oct. 8, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file).
107. L.A. Times, supra note 94, at Al, col. 2. This finding concerned inspectors because
a hydrogen bomb has over one hundred times the power of a conventional atomic bomb. Docu-
ments found indicate Iraq intended to produce 220 pounds of Lithium per year. As of October
1991 inspectors had not discovered any Lithium during investigations. Id.
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nation supplied Saddam Hussein with the means to further his nu-
clear research.' 0 For example, Germany, in particular, has several
firms which supplied Saddam Hussein with the equipment necessary
for uranium enrichment. The Bonn government notified the Special
Commission that German companies began to ship 10,000 gas cen-
trifuges to Iraq in 1989.109 Functional centrifuges would have pro-
duced amounts of enriched uranium sufficient to construct twenty to
twenty-five weapons per year.110 In addition, inspectors discovered
proof of Iraq conducting test blasts of nuclear weapon's components
prior to the Gulf conflict, thereby producing further evidence of the
significant advances made by Iraq in its pursuit of nuclear
capabilities.111
Iraq was a nuclear threat at the advent of the Gulf crisis in
August 1990, and without the timely occurrence of the conflict, Sad-
dam Hussein would have acquired a means to ensure international
power and domination: There is a distinct possibility that Iraq would
have possessed a nuclear bomb within twelve to eighteen months had
the conflict not occurred.' 12 This is suggested by the fact that evi-
dence removed during inspections revealed Iraq's mastery over a ma-
jority of the components necessary for a nuclear weapon. The coun-
try lacked only a sufficient amount of uranium to detonate a
bomb.' However, since researchers were conducting three parallel
enrichment programs simultaneously, it was only a matter of time
before enough uranium was accumulated to construct a weapon.
Once Iraq conquered bomb building techniques, the country could
build an arsenal composed of two to three additional explosives by
the mid-1990s. 114
B. Factors Contributing to the Iraqi Program
1. Intelligence Failures.-In the immediate aftermath of the
Commission's discoveries, government officials from many countries
questioned how Iraq continued to acquire the technology necessary
to manufacture a bomb without detection by the IAEA. The United
States, in addition to other nations, openly admits to intelligence
108. L.A. Times, supra note 73, at A12, col. 3. David Kay, head of the sixth inspection
team stated: "There is no region of the world that you will find that did not contribute to [the]
program. It was a procurement network of breadth and sophistication." Id.
109. Iraq May Have Produced Nuclear Weapon Report, The Reuters Library Report,
(Jan. 13, 1992) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file) [hereinafter Iraq May Have Produced];
Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1992, at A20.
110. Iraq May Have Produced, supra note 109.
111. Chic. Trib., Oct. 26, 1991, at 3, zone C.
112. Nuclear Weapons In Iraq, supra note 65.
113. Id. David Kay testified: "Our conclusion is that the principal limiting factor at this
time was the possession of enriched material; that all other aspects of weapons design they had
pursued were relatively in hand." Id.
114. U.N. Inspector, supra note 104.
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failures regarding Iraq both prior to and during the Gulf conflict. In
general, Iraqi society is closed to foreigners, thus making infiltration
by intelligence agencies nearly impossible. Although in the past de-
fectors provided pertinent information, typically, the only data avail-
able to the outside world was that which the Iraqi government selec-
tively leaked.
During the conflict, intelligence failures, in conjunction with
bad weather which postponed investigatory flights, were responsible
for miscalculations. In general,. "The lack of reliable information in-
side Iraq's tightly controlled, highly compartmentalized nuclear pro-
gram greatly hindered precise targeting by allied air com-
manders."" 5 Bombing missions neglected to target and destroy
buildings crucial to the Iraqi program. " 6 Officials did not link facili-
ties, such as Al-Atheer, with nuclear research until weeks before the
war ended, at which time inclement weather prevented attacks.
11 7
The intelligence failures which occurred during the Gulf conflict will
have long standing implications for the effectiveness of the interna-
tional community's control over nuclear proliferation. Today, govern-
ments vocalize concerns not only regarding technology which might
remain hidden in Iraq, but also about the value of intelligence agen-
cies in evaluating-the defense systems of potential enemies.
2. Iraq's Deception.-Despite the international community's
acknowledged weaknesses-in determining the extent of Saddam Hus-
sein's nuclear program, a majority of the undetected advances are
attributable to Iraq's dedication to the attainment of nuclear weap-
ons and the deceptive techniques employed to disguise the program.
Since 1981 Iraq's government directed an estimated $10 billion of oil
revenues towards research1 8 and employed approximately 10,000
scientists, thus making Iraq's technical and scientific investment in
nuclear weapons the largest in the Middle East." 9 To support the
internal base, Iraq imported technology from numerous western na-
tions, including the United States. 2 '
Currently, however, there is no conclusive evidence indicating
direct participation by foreign governments in furthering Iraq's pro-
gram. Rather, a majority of the advances resulted from the deceptive
nature of Iraq's dealings with foreign corporations and the way in
which Saddam Hussein disguised material at research facilities. In
115. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1991, at A6, col. 1.
116. N.Y. Times, supra note 93, at Al, col. 3
117. Two Iraqi Nuclear Sites Survived Gulf War, supra note 103.
118. N.Y. Times, supra note 70, at A6, col. 1.
119. Boston Globe, Oct. 4, 1991, at 19.
120. Nightline: How Close Iraq Came, supra note 63. For example, experts linked the
electronic infrastructure which Iraq needed to run its covert program to the Hewlett Packard
Company.
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addition to using front companies to obtain parts, Iraq limited
purchases to industrial goods, such as tools and equipment, from
which it could manufacture the necessary components. 121 Many of
the goods purchased abroad had dual uses which included innocent
applications.122 Thus, Iraq could obtain the material necessary for a
bomb without arousing suspicion.
Once the technology reached Iraq and was applied to the nu-
clear weapons program, Saddam Hussein escaped detection by hid-
ing facilities and utilizing loopholes in the NPT. Technically, Iraq
did not violate the NPT until it separated three grams of plutonium
at the Tuwaitha facility sometime after 1987.1 a Earlier experiments
conducted by scientists remained within the boundries of the NPT
because they utilized five fuels exempted from the safeguards.124 In
addition, Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA covered only
those facilities which Iraq declared as processing plants for pluto-
nium or uranium. 5 Therefore, a substantial amount of covert nu-
clear research went undetected because it occurred in allegedly inno-
cent facilities.
Iraq's obtainment of the technology necessary to build nuclear
bombs cannot be attributed to a single factor. Although intelligence
failures and exports by the Western nations facilitated advance-
ments, they are not solely responsible for Iraq's developments.
Neither tighter export controls nor infiltration by intelligence groups
could have prevented Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weap-
ons. Using alternative means, he would have found components for
the weapons and disguised them in a manner so as not to raise suspi-
cion. It is this unfaltering determination to possess nuclear weapons
which members of the UN fear most.
VI. The United Nations Successes and Failures
A. The United Nations Resolutions
Although the Resolutions adopted by the UN in an attempt to
dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are some of the most
Draconian actions ever taken by the Security Council against a
Member State, they may not be sufficient to eradicate the Iraqi
threat. Members of the UN realistically fear that Saddam Hussein
121. U.N. Inspector, supra note 104; L.A. Times, supra note 96, at A6, col. 2. For
example, documents found during inspections indicate that Iraq's hydrogen bomb program was
"homegrown." Id.
122. N.Y. Times, supra note 93, at A9, col.4.
123. Albright and Hibbs, News the Front Page Missed, The Bull. of Atomic Scientists,
Oct. 1991, at 7 [hereinafter Front Page]. The violation occurred because researchers utilized a
safeguarded fuel fabrication laboratory to manufacture unsafeguarded fuel.
124. Id.
125. Ten Years Ago, supra note 19, at 5.
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will either circumvent the Resolutions, or refuse to comply with
them and rebuild his nuclear empire in the same way he conducted a
covert program for the past ten years."' 6 Resolution 687 has given
the UN inspection teams precedent setting, blanket authority to visit
undeclared facilities; however, this power is only as useful as the in-
formation that the UN has regarding Iraq's program.
Thus far, by utilizing tips from defectors in conjunction with the
limited resources of intelligence agencies, investigators have discov-
ered what appear to be the primary components of Iraq's research.
Nonetheless, the UN should not underestimate the remains of the
preexisting program or Saddam Hussein's determination to utilize
salvaged parts to rebuild his program. Members of the inspection
teams, such as Dr. David Kay, believe that soldiers dispersed and hid
much of the nuclear material for future use.12 Similarly, Rolf
Ekeus, Chairman of the Special Commission, will not exclude the
possibility that Iraq possesses a secret plutonium factory and perhaps
a clandestine stock of enriched uranium as well. 128
Even if the enforcement of the Resolutions results in the discov-
ery of all tangible aspects of Iraq's program, the inspection teams
can not destroy the technology ingrained in the minds of the scien-
tists: "You can remove the equipment, you can remove the fissile
material, you can destroy the instruments, but you cannot take out
the know how." 12 9 It was for this reason, the Iraqi government at-
tempted to confiscate personnel records discovered by an inspection
team. 3 ' With this information the UN can, with limited effective-
ness, ensure that Saddam Hussein does not use the expertise for re-
building. However, even this insight into the masterminds behind
Iraq's nuclear advancements will not completely eradicate the threat
of future nuclear proliferation in Iraq.
126. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1992, at Al, col. 3. In early February 1992 Iraq explicitly
rejected the UN's proposed long term plan to monitor the country's military industry and
refused to provide a detailed report on the defense industry as required by Resolution 707.
Iraq " 'does not recognize' that it has 'any obligations under these Resolutions'" and " '[will]
not make nay further declarations' on weapons production plans, effectively challenging the
United Nations inspectors to go ahead and find whatever they are looking for." Id.
127. U.N. Inspector, supra note 104. Although Dr. Kay admitted that allied bombing
destroyed much of Baghdad's program, he also stated: "They certainly have the technology
and skill. . .the question is the material which'they have dispersed and hidden and we have
not completely found." Id.
128. N.Y. Times, supra note 70, at A6, col. 1.
129. Wash. Post, supra note 95, at Al. As quoted by Maurizio Zifferero, head of the
IAEA's inspection operation.
130. U.N. Nuclear Weapons Team Leaves Baghdad, The Reuters Library Report (Sept.
30, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file). As justification for confiscating the records,
Iraq alleged a necessity to protect atomic energy workers from terrorist attacks by Israel and
the United States.
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B. Subsequent Enforcement Measures
Only months after the adoption of the cease-fire measures, ru-
mors circulated that Saddam Hussein initiated a new program for
nuclear research' 1 Despite "the UN [doing] far more to uncover
and disrupt Saddam's nuclear weapons program with its inspections
than Desert Storm accomplished in six weeks of bombing," the Iraqi
nuclear threat remained.' 32 Forced to reevaluate its posture, the Se-
curity Council searched for a means to ensure Iraqi compliance.
Sadly, the UN's options are limited. For example, it would be futile
and self defeating to invalidate Iraq's membership to the NPT and
IAEA. Even though these agreements did not prevent the develop-
ment of covert nuclear research, they help to maintain a link be-
tween Iraq and the rest of the world by providing authorized access
to some facilities. Therefore, the IAEA can formally condemn Iraq
for violating the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the agency,
but cannot resort to more drastic measures. 133 Realistically, a verbal
condemnation will have little effect on a country who willingly con-
fronts the allied superpowers. In light of these limitations, the UN
must rely either on additional resolutions or resort once again to mil-
itary action to ensure actual acquiescence with demands.
1. Additional UN Declarations.-In response to Iraq's harass-
ment of and lack of cooperation with the inspection teams, the Se-
curity Council initiated additional declarations regarding Iraq's nu-
clear program. On October 11, 1991, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 715, a comprehensive plan "to provide the international.
community with security over a long term that Iraq has not resumed
its clandestine program of producing weapons of mass destruc-
tion."'' This extended monitoring plan once again forbids Iraq to
ever possess nuclear weapons, in addition to requiring the submission
of reports by Baghdad regarding scientific and industrial activities
with military applications. 35 In contrast to previous measures, Reso-
lution 715 demands reports on equipment and other materials uti-
lized for peaceful purposes as well as military ones.' 3 6 With this re-
quirement, the UN hopes to avoid any loopholes which Saddam
Hussein could use to rebuild his program without violating the Reso-
131. Wash. Post, supra note 95, at A45, col. 2.
132. Thomas, supra note 22, at 35.
133. Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1991, at C7. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, parties to the NPT have the power to expunge Iraq from membership. Hibbs, supra
note 28, at 15. However, rather than expelling Iraq, the AYE Board of Governors voted, on
July 18, 1991, to condemn the state for violating the NPT and its safeguards agreement with
the AYE.
134. How Close Iraq Came, supra note 63.
135. Chic. Trib., Oct. 2, 1991, at C3.
136. Id.
[V61. 10:3
S NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
lutions. Although more intrusive than the previous Resolutions, the
UN can justify 715 on the basis of Iraq's and specifically, Saddam
Hussein's previous actions, both during and after the Gulf conflict.
On October 24, 1991, the UN instituted another dramatic step
toward ensuring that Saddam Hussein never acquires weapons of
mass destruction."' 7 The UN endorsed a plan presented by Rolf
Ekeus, Chairman of the Special Commission, that requires the de-
struction of not only the technology used to produce nuclear bombs,
but also the facilities and the equipment utilized to manufacture
bomb components.' 8 Even with the apparent all encompassing na-
ture of these guidelines, experts express their concern that agencies
will make exceptions for dual use materials if Iraq convinces the UN
of legitimate uses and agrees to place materials under safeguards. 9
As a precaution, the Resolution requires experts to presume an ille-
gal purpose of any facilities and equipment with possible military
objectiyes1 40
2. Military Action.-With the enactment of the subsequent
Resolution, the UN eliminated a majority of the loopholes available
to Saddam Hussein for rebuilding his nuclear program. Any others
which exist will most likely be discovered only if Iraq attempts to
manufacture another bomb. A realistic possibility exists that the Se-
curity Council's actions will not deter Iraq's determination to ac-
quire nuclear weapons. The Iraqi threat may require additional mili-
tary pressure by the allied forces. President Bush already indicated
his willingness to reactivate armed forces when Iraqi soldiers held
the sixth inspection team hostage. In this situation, the threat of mil-
itary action was sufficient to obtain the release of the team without
actual confrontation. However, one must balance this success with
the failure of a military threat to achieve an Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait. The threat of a military strike alone may not always achieve
desired objectives. Therefore, the UN, in conjunction with the allies,
must stand firm not only in their verbal commitment to prevent nu-
clear proliferation, but must also exemplify a willingness to engage
in military action if necessary to ensure compliance.
VIi. Implications For the Future
Throughout the Gulf crisis, the UN and, in particular, the Se-
curity Council played a precedent setting role by confronting the
threat which Iraq posed to world security. In recent years, a growing
137. N.Y. Times, supra note 80, at A7, col. 1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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skepticism developed as countries questioned not only the power of
the UN as a peacekeeping agency, but also "the role of the Security
Council as a force distinct from the interacting behavior of its mem-
ber states . ."141 However, the advent of Saddam Hussein's inva-
sion of Kuwait and the subsequent discovery of an advanced clandes-
tine nuclear program in Iraq dramatically expanded the role of the
UN in shaping international relations.
Reflecting on the firm posture adopted by the Security Council
to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Resolutions, leaders of many
nations recognize "there is a demonstrated cause for hope in the co-
operative performance at the United Nations, and it is not wrong to
think that we may get help from that body on the wider and inescap-
ably multinational question of nuclear danger."142 As inspectors dis-
mantle the remains of Iraq's weapons program, the UN Charter and
the instruments available under it continue to gain credibility and
establish a framework for an evolving rule of law.143
Amidst this optimism, however, there exists a practical reality
that the UN may not have the resources to play as forceful a role in
other international incidents as it has in post-war Iraq. Today, the
UN acts in the midst of deep financial difficulties. As a result of
unpaid dues, Member States owe the international organization
more than $800 million. 4" Without sufficient funds, the UN will be
forced to cut several programs which could affect controls on nuclear
proliferation. Moreover, the Gulf conflict and the position chosen by
the Security Council in dealing with Saddam Hussein's barbaric and
deceptive practices is best described as precedent setting. Only the
willingness of the UN to adopt an unorthodox approach to the Iraqi
situation permitted the agency to "fulfill its role of acting to restore
international peace and security and to resolve conflict ... .
For the first time in history, the UN openly sought the assis-
tance of national intelligence agencies to provide the Special Com-
mission with information about Iraq and their nuclear weapons pro-
gram. In a similar precedent setting manner, the Special
Commission, organized under Resolutions 687 and 699, joined forces
with the IAEA so as to gain access to the agency's expertise and
equipment, thus facilitating the search for a clandestine program.
Until the crisis, the UN viewed the IAEA as a foreign state with
which one negotiated rather than an instrument to link members
with each other's national security.146 The UN's request that the
141. Bundy, supra note 49, at 91.
142. Id.
143. Kaysen, supra note 1, at 101.
144. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1992, at Al, col. 6.
145. Bolton, supra note 30, at 545.
146. Iraq's Nuclear Capability: Capitol Hill Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
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agency conduct on site inspections, remove and destroy all items re-
lating to the nuclear weapons program, and prepare a long term plan
for the continual monitoring of Iraq's nuclear intentions expanded
the ability and power of the IAEA to limit nuclear proliferation. In
contrast to the restricted inspections conducted under the NPT, the
Resolutions gave the Special Commission blanket authority to search
both declared and undeclared facilities in conjunction with the abil-
ity to use aircraft for thorough investigations. In addition, although
given an agenda to follow, the Special Commission did not receive
any time limitations, and, therefore, could remain in Iraq until satis-
fied with the discoveries made. Without these liberal and admittedly
intrusive measures, inspection teams could not have discovered Sad-
dam Hussein's well disguised program. Therefore, in analyzing the
implications which the UN's role in Iraq will have on the future of
nuclear proliferation, one must consider the context of the Iraqi situ-
ation and the unprecedented steps which the UN willingly took to
defeat a nation and a leader who overtly and covertly undermined
the international system.
To prevent further nuclear proliferation in Iraq as well as in
other nations, the UN must continue to play an active and forceful
role in international politics. Although "with the political mandate
the UN has increasing received for peacekeeping. . .the doors may
finally be opening for practical applications of 'collective security' as
envisioned by the framers of the UN Charter nearly fifty years ago,"
the agency, without reservation, must continue to invoke measures
against threatening nations similar to the Draconian Resolutions en-
acted against Iraq. 47 In addition, once the Special Commission com-
pletes the internal examination of Iraq's facilities, the UN should
not abandon the relationships established with national intelligence
agencies or the IAEA. Instead, she should nurture and develop a
strong posture of collective security. Only a cooperative alliance be-
tween these separate entities can expose covert nuclear research.
Furthermore, to ensure the efficient and effective use of the affilia-
tion, the international community must extend additional power and
authority to the IAEA so as to transform the agency from an infor-
mation gathering system into a group, which in conjunction with the
UN and national intelligence agencies, will safeguard and control
the spread 'of nuclear arsenals.
Similarly, the signatory members of the NPT need to reaffirm
the treaty during the review session in 1995. The NPT, although
failing to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Iraq, still repre-
Committee About the Middle East, The Reuters Library Report (Oct. 23, 1991) (LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current file) [hereinafter Iraq's Nuclear Capibility].
147. Wurst, supra note 43, at 12.
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sents an insurance policy against nuclear proliferation - "A world
without [the] NPT would lead to diminished political constraints on
the spread of nuclear explosives, increase regional suspicion and ten-
sion and jeopardize international peace and stability." 14 8 Only
through the continuing use of collective security will the interna-
tional community eradicate the formidable threat of nuclear
proliferation.
VIII. Conclusion
As the one year anniversary of the Gulf War passes, the UN
can optimistically reflect on its successes in dismantling a majority of
the Iraqi nuclear threat. The Gulf crisis illustrates "that possession
of nuclear weapons can be put off limits for a particular dangerous
government, at least when the grounds for such action is clear and
the power to act sufficient. ' 149 However, these advancements are
only short term. A realistic possibility exists based on historic prece-
dent that Iraq will circumvent the Resolutions and initiate a new
program. Although inspection teams appear to have destroyed the
infrastructure utilized in the production of fissile material, Iraq, in
the absence of constant monitoring, can rebuild the physical plants
in "a few, rather than many, years."16 In addition, revelations about
Iraq's clandestine research may spur other Third World nations to
acquire nuclear weapons because they might perceive their necessity
as a deterrent to nuclear armed countries. The recent disintegration
of the former Soviet Union into three independent Baltic nations and
the Commonwealth of Independent States exacerbates this concern.
Intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, fear a "Soviet nuclear 'brain
drain.' "151 In other words, as a result of the poor economic condi-
tions in the former Soviet Union, scientists with the skills to design
nuclear weapons may emigrate to developing nations such as Iraq, or
may remain in their homeland but provide intelligence to other coun-
tries in return for cash. 152 In either situation, nations with aspira-
tions of nuclear arsenals could benefit from the Soviet Union's
demise.
Long term stability in the Middle East requires the creation of
a nuclear weapons free zone - "any viable and effective solution to
issues related to the proliferation of nuclear arms must be based on
the equal banning of all weapons and systems of mass destruc-
148. Fact Sheet, supra note 12, at 12.
149. Bundy, supra note 49, at 94.
150. CIA Chief Fears Soviet Nuclear Drain, Sees Iraq Still A Threat, The Reuters
Library Report (Jan. 15, 1992) (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file) [hereinafter CIA Chief
Fears].
151. Id.
152. Id.
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tion."'1 3 The Iraqi situation represents only a single example of the
growing threat of a nuclear confrontation in the post Cold War era.
As President Bush stated, "The proliferation problem [can] worsen
because of the greater availability of materials and technologies, dif-
ficult economic times in potential supplier countries and regional ani-
mosities." '' Although the emerging detente between the superpow-
ers "freed the United Nations from the political paralysis that has
hindered it for most of its 46 years of existency, ' '155 effective control
over the spread of nuclear weapons requires first a "realization by
individual governments that it is foolish to get involved in a nuclear
arms race." 156
Michele E. Martin
153. Kemp, supra note 48, at 453.
154. CIA Chief Fears, supra note 151.
155. N.Y. Times, supra note 144, at Al, col. 6.
156. L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al, col. 6.
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